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an interest in the future.72 Invalidity, even under cy pres, would result
when the essential purpose of the creator is a perpetuity,73 and in-
testacy under cy pres would result in the not inconceivable case where
intestacy would most closely appropriate the creator's intent.7 4
The judicial adoption of complete cy pres, as well as the better
method of legislative enactment, 75 is a major advance in relegating the
Rule Against Perpetuities to its proper function. "It should be a check
on vain, capricious action by wealthy empire-builders. But it should
not be a constantly present threat to reasonable dispositions which
slightly overstep a technical line." 76 Cy pres may require a case by case
determination of the validity of an interest when a perpetuities prob-
lem is presented, 77 but can it be said that the gift of one testator is any
less important to him or his intended beneficiaries than is the gift of
another? "People do not intentionally violate the Rule; they stumble
into it, and if a court saves them from their own ineptitude it is doing
a good thing, not a bad thing."7 8 By a frank acknowledgment of refor-
mation in the courts through cy pres, the absence of obviously artificial
constructions will be missed by no one and undoubtedly more gifts
will be saved from harsh applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
G. BARKER STEIN, JR.
TESTS FOR DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
At common law and until recent years, an employer's discrimina-
tory hiring practices were entirely free from legal restrictions.1 The
employer-employee relationship was considered a contractual matter,
requiring the assent of both parties and was limited only by the con-
469 P.2d 183, 185 n.4 (Hawaii 197o).
7J. MoRRIs & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPErumEs 36 (2d ed. 1962);
cf. St. Amour v. Rivard 2 Mich. 293 (1852); Clayton v. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 8o S.E.2d
29 (1954).
74Cf. Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform Without
Waiting, 2o STAN. L. REv. 459, 469 (1968).
"Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973, 983 (1965).
Legislative enactments of complete cy pres alone include: CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5
(West Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 129 1b, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1969).
,6J. MoRIs & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 36 (2d ed. 1962).
"R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 121 (1966).
78Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts, and Practitioners Can Do
About the Follies of the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 351, 356 (1965).
'See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915); Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co.,
184 F.2d 837 (0oth Cir. 195o); People v. Chicago, Minn. & St. P. Ry., 306 Ill. 486, 138
N.E. 155 (1923) (dictum); Avins, Toward Freedom of Choice in Employment, 13
N.Y.L.F. 213, 237-41 (1967).
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tract itself.2 The employer had a right to hire only those employees
he desired, and the employee, likewise, had a right to choose the em-
ployer for whom he would work.3 Moreover, equity courts would not
order specific performance of an employment contract and would not
order reinstatement even if the employee were wrongfully discharged.4
In short, both the employer and the employee had an absolute right
to freedom of choice in employment.5
Although the employee's right to choose his employer has not been
hampered, the employer's discretion in hiring has been sharply cur-
tailed by the enactment of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 19647 and
various state civil rights acts of similar impact. s New York was the
-See Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., x98 F. Supp. 402, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
Electricians Local 205 v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Mass. 1959);
ef. Fersing v. Fast, 121 F.2d 531, 536 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
3See Van Zandt v. McKee, 20o2 F.2d 490 (sth Cir. 1953) (where the court stated,
"One man's right to work stops short of the other fellow's right not to hire him."
202 F.2d at 491); People v. Chicago, Minn. &- St. P. Ry., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155
(1923). Cf. Jones v. American Pres. Lines, 308 P.2d 393 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Note that the various labor laws did nothing to control discrimination on the part
of the private employer.
'Avins, Toward Freedom of Choice in Employment, x3 N.Y.L.F. 213, 242
(1967). See, e.g., Stevenot v. Norberg, 210 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1954); Shubert v. Wood-
ward, 167 F. 47 (8th Cir. 19o9).
rSee, e.g., cases cited note i, supra.
OSee, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAv § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970). States have enacted
these anti-discrimination laws under the authority of their police power. Thus,
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney Supp. 1976) reads
1. This article shall be known as the "Human Rights Law".
2. It shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for
the protection of the public welfare, health and peace of the people
of the state ....
Although the constitutional validity of the state employment discrimination laws
has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court, the Court has indicated
that they would be upheld by its decision in two cases. See Railway Mail Ass'n
v. Corsi, 326 U.. 88 (1945); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
The state's discretion in hiring has been curtailed from the beginning by the
first amendment which reads in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion..." and by the fourteenth amendment which reads in
part, "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
742 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (1964) reads in part, that
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(i) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
"See Garfinkel and Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring
and Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 20o LAB. L.J. 357, 363 (1969); Hill,
Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practices Commissions: A Critical Analysis
with Recommendations, 14 BuFF. L. Rv. 22 (1964); Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAL. L. REV. 729, 775 (1965).
N.Y. E.XFE. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970) is typical; "It shpll be an unri-
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first state to enact a law prohibiting discrimination by private em-
ployers,9 and at the present time approximately seventy-five percent
of the states have similar civil rights acts in effect. 10 Under these civil
lawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer, because of the age, race,
creed, color, national origin or sex of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ...
such individual...."
gGarfinkel and Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring and
Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 20 LAB. L.J. 357, 363 (1969). The New
York Civil Rights Law, (N.Y. CIVIL RIGHrs LAw §§ 4o-c to 44-a (McKinney Supp.
1970) originally enacted as Act of February 17, 1909 §§ 1.62), which preceded
the Human Rights Law (N.Y. ExEC. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (origin-
ally enacted as Act of March 12, 1945, ch. 118 §§ 125-136, 168 Stat. 457)), barred
discrimination in employment only in the case of public employees, public utility
employees, labor organizations and defense contractors. The private employer in
New York, on the other hand, was not barred from discrimination until the enact-
ment of the Human Rights Law in 1945. Nevertheless, since the Federal Civil
Rights Act and many other states' civil rights laws do prohibit discrimination by a
private employer, the anti-discrimination laws will be referrred to throughout the
text as "civil rights laws".
Note that the New York Law does refer to the right to employment without
discrimination as a civil right.
The opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination be-
cause of race, creed, sex, color or national origin is hereby recogniz-
ed as and declared to be a civil right (emphasis added).
N.Y. Exac. LAw § 291 (McKinney Supp. 197o).
Compare N.Y. ExEc. L w §§ 292, 297 (McKinney Supp. 197o ) with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2ooo, oooe-5 (1964). Note that the New York Law, upon which the Federal Law
was modeled, is more favorable to the employee. Under the New York Law, the
employee has the choice of taking his case before the Division of Human Rights
or filing a civil action in the courts. However, under the Federal Law an employee
must first file his complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The New York Law also has a more favorable statute of limitations-one
year-as opposed to the federal statute of limitations of ninety days. Moreover,
the Division of Human Rights in New York has power to issue court enforceable
cease and desist orders, whereas the EEOC powers are limited to conference,
conciliation and persuasion. Note also that the definition of "employer" in the
New York Law is broader than that in the Federal Law. "The term 'employer' does
not include any employer with fewer than four persons in his employ." N.Y.
ExEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney Supp. 1970). "The term 'employer' means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year. " 42 U.S.C. § 2ote (b) (1964). Moreover, when an
alleged discriminatory hiring practice is prohibited by a state or local law, the
EEOC must defer to the local agency which will have sixty days to act. For a
discussion of the differences between state and federal employment discrimination
laws, see Barone, The Impact of Recent Development in Civil Rights on Employers
and Unions, 17 LAB. L.J. 413 (1967).
1
0ALAsKA STAT. § x8.80.220 (Supp. 197o), amending §§ 18.18.2oo -.28o (1969);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461 to -1466 (Supp. 1969); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-1433
(West Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-2, -4, -6 (Supp. 1969), amending
§§ 8o-21-1 to -8 (1963); CONN. GxN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-122 to -128 (Supp. 1970),
amending §§ 31-122 to -128 (1958); DFL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710-712 (Supp. 1968);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to -38 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-1701 to -1704;
67-5901 to -5912 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 852, 853 , 855 , 856, 859
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rights laws, a private employer's discretion in hiring has become cir-
cumscribed to the extent that he must be prepared to justify any de-
cision he makes concerning hiring or firing.1
In Eastern Greyhound Lines Division of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
New York State Division of Human Rights ex rel. Ibrahim,12 an action
based upon an alleged violation of the New York Human Rights Law,
13
a New York appellate court unanimously annulled the determination
of the State Human Rights Appeal Board that Greyhound had violated
section 29614 of that law by refusing to employ a bearded Muslim as a
baggage clerk. The court held that Greyhound's failure to offer em-
ployment was justified and legal. The facts of the case reveal the
fine line between an illegal discriminatory hiring practice and a
"practical business policy".15
(Supp. 1970), amending ch. 48, § 851-67 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
40-2308 to -2310, -2312, -2317 (a) (Supp. 1970), amending §§ 40-2301 to -2328 (1965);
IowA CODE ANN. §§ 105 A.1-A.14 (Supp. 197o); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1OO1 to -1005,
-lOOg, -ioll to -1O3 (Supp. 1969), amending §§ 44-1ool to -1014 (1964); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.510, .520, .530 (Supp. 1970), amending §§ 344.oio -,99o (169);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 861-64 (Supp. 197o); MD. ANN. CODE art. 4913, §§
17-19 (Supp. 1969), amending art. 49
B
, §§ 17-20 (1968); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17458(1)
-(11) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 -. o6, .071-.073, .o91, .io, .ioi, .115, .116, .12,
.121, .122 (Supp. 1970) , amending §§ 363.o1-.13 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT: §§ 296,OO, :020,
.050 (Supp. 1970), amending §§ 296.OO -. 070 (1965); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§
64-301 to -303 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to -1125 (1968); NET. REv. STAT.
§§ 613.310 -430 (1967); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3 54-A:3, 3 5 4-A:8 (1969),
amending §§ 35 4-A:1 to -A:14 (1966); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-1 (Supp. 1957);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-1 to -13 (Supp. 1969), formerly §§ 59-4-1 to -14 (196o);
N.Y. E Ec. LAW §§ 290-299 (McKinney Supp. 197o), amending §§ 290-3o1 (Mc-
Kinney 1951); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01 to .07, 4112.09 to .11, 4112.99
(Baldwin Supp. 1969), amending §§ 4112.01 to .o8, 4112.99 (1964); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1101-1802 <Supp. 1970); ORE. RE V. STAT. §§ 649.010 -. 990 (1969);
PA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 952-55, 955.1, 957, 958-1, 959, 959.1, 960, 962, 962.1 (Supp.
1970), amending tit. 43 §§ 991-63 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-5-8
(Supp. 1969), amending §§ 28-1-5 to -39 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-1 to -8
(Supp. 1969), formerly §§ 34-17-1 to -8 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495-495(C)
(1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.O10, .o30, .o40, .180, 190, .200, .216,
.217, .222 -.226, .310 (Supp. 197o), amending §§ 49.6O.OO -.320 (1958); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-1 to -16 (Supp. 1970), formerly §§ 5-11-1 to -.6 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.32, 111.325, 111.33, 111.35, 111.36, 111..7 (Supp. 197o), amend-
ing §§ 111.31-.36 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-257 tO -264 (1967).
uSee Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 197o);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
"34 App. Div. 2d 916, 311 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
"Ihe action was based upon an alleged violation of N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296
(McKinney Supp. 1970), which provides in part: "It shall be an unlawful discrimina-
tory practice: (a) for an employer, because of the ... creed... of any individual,
to refuse to hire or employ... such individual...."
IAN.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
"311 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
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The respondent,16 Abdullahi Ibrahim, wore a beard in accordance
with his religious beliefs under the Orthodox Muslim faith. He applied
for a position with Greyhound and was refused the job solely because
he wore a beard, inasmuch as Greyhound's hiring practices include a
uniformly applied, nation-wide policy that all employees be clean-
shaven. Ibrahim, thus, charged Greyhound with an unlawful discrimina-
tory hiring practice prejudicial -to his Muslim faith. The case arose
before the court on a petition to review the determination of the
Human Rights Appeal Board.
In deciding Greyhound, the court was faced with the difficulty of
determining what hiring discrimination on the part of an employer
constitutes a violation of a civil rights act.17 The court upheld peti-
tioner's refusal to hire. In doing so, it relied on several mitigating
factors.' 8 In the first place, Greyhound's hiring policy is uniformly
applied and adhered to by all of its nation-wide divisions. Secondly,
Greyhound's purpose in refusing to hire Ibrahim seemed to the court
to have been in accord with a practical business policy, rather than
an unlawful discriminatory practice. Thirdly, (and this was emphasized
by the court), Greyhound, as a private employer, is not required to
make exceptions to its established and uniformly applied personnel
policies in order to accommodate the religious practice of a potential
employee. Finally, Greyhound could not be charged with lack of good
faith.
Despite the enactment of the civil rights laws revising the common
law on the employer-employee relationship,' 9 the courts have been
hard-pressed to discover a satisfactory, uniform test for determining
when discrimination in hiring has in fact occurred.2 0 Thus, a number
of different tests have been used.
The simplest test, and the one often advocated by employers, may
be referred to as ,the per se test since it examines the alleged discrimina-
tory practice of the employer to determine whether in itself it con-
stitutes a violation of the law. Thus, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp..,2 a case involving alleged discrimination in employment in that
"Actually the Division of Human Rights was acting as respondent but inasmuch
as the action was in behalf of Abdullahi Ibrahim and it was he who was allegedly
discriminated against, for the sake of clarification he will he referred to as
respondent.
2N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
311 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
nNotes 2 through 8 and accompanying text supra.
2OCompare Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 and Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 3oo F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969) with Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
11411 F.2d i (5th Cir. 1969).
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females with pre-school children were not considered for employment
although males were, the company defended on the premise that its
hiring practice was not "per se discrimination on the basis of 'sex'." 22
The court agreed inasmuch as "[a] per se violation of the Act can only
be discrimination based solely on one of the categories i.e., in the case
of sex; women vis-A-vis men. '2 3 However, it went on to say that "[w]hen
another criterion of employment is added to one of the classifications
listed in the Act," the court must look further "to determine if any
individual or group is being denied work due to his race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin."24 But after stating that the per se test
would not be sufficient in this case, the court in essence reverted to it.
By holding that the hiring practice in question was not illegal since it
was based on a "coalescence of two elements," 25 sex and pre-school
children, the court implied that the practice was allowed to stand
since it was not based upon sex alone. The court failed to examine the
fact that whether the position applied for was filled by another female
without pre-school children or by a male with or without pre-school
children, had the plaintiff not been a female, she would have been
considered. Thus, regardless of the fact that the employer's hiring prac-
tice was based on a coalescence of two elements, it resulted in discrimi-
nation against the applicant because she was a female.
However, other courts have looked beyond the employer's alleged
discriminatory act to its impact to determine whether discrimination
has in fact occurred.26 The test utilized under this approach may be
referred to as the final impact test. Under this approach the questioned
act itself is no longer the controlling factor-the court also examines the
result. Thus, in Dewey v. Reynolds,J 2 a case involving discharge of an
employee for his refusal to work or find a replacement for Sunday over-
time shifts, both of which were forbidden by his religious beliefs, the
court said, "The ... rule is not discriminatory on its face, but this is
only the first step. Is the rule discriminatory in its impact?" 28 There-
fore, an employer must be prepared to defend the final impact as well
as the practice itself.
In examining these two tests, it is important to note both their





mSee, e.g., Local 189, AFL-CIO v. United States, 416 F.2d 98o (5th Cir. 1969);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 3oo F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
'3oo F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
"Id. at 714.
1971]
200 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
discriminatory under either the per se or the final impact test, it will be
allowed to stand.29 Proof that a hiring practice is discriminatory under
the per se test is prima facie evidence30 of illegality which can be over-
come only by evidence on the part of the employer that his discrimina-
tory practice is based on a bona fide occupational requirement. 31
However, the final impact test does not necessarily test illegal discrimi-
nation. Many hiring practices will have a discriminatory impact,
which may or may not be illegal depending upon the reason for the
discrimination. 32 Thus, when a hiring practice is found to be discrimi-
natory under the final impact test, it is necessary to proceed further
to determine whether the hiring practice is illegal. However, since
further inquiry to a certain extent shifts the burden of producing
evidence to the employer, it is not to be pursued until the employee has
established prima fade evidence of illegality.33
There must be some basis for illegality before a hiring practice is prohibited.
Since there are only two ways in which a given action can be illegal -either on its
face or in its impact- if the act can withstand a per se and a final impact test,
it would follow that the action would be allowed to stand.
"'Prima facie evidence is that which, when uncontradicted or unexplained, is
sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed." J. TRAcT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF EvIDENcE 7 (1952). Therefore, in the case of an alleged violation of a civil rights
law, prima facie evidence would be evidence sufficient to maintain discrimination
on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, or sex if uncontradicated or
unexplained.
s142 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(e)(1) (1964). See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
'1 See Local 189, AFL-CIO v. United States, 416 F.2d 98o (5th Cir. 1969).
*When an employee charges an employer with an illegal discriminatory hiring
practice, it is the employee, as complainant, not the employer, who is to bear the
burden of proof; he is to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer
has violated a specific statute. Carter v. McCarthy's Cafe, Inc., 4 RAcE REL. L. REP.
641 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1959). The employee can only relieve himself of this burden
by producing sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of illegality on
the part of the employer. If the employee fails to meet this burden, the case must
be dismissed. Nevertheless, when the final impact test is used, the employee is often
required to prove only the possibility of a cause of action and the burden of
producing evidence is in effect shifted to the employer, for the courts through the
use of further testing look to the employer's evidence to see if it is sufficient to
justify his hiring practice and overcome any implication of illegality. See Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 898, 418 (1963) (dissenting opinion by Harlan, J.); Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 3oo F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968); B-NA, CIVIL RIGHTs Acr oF 1964: WHAT
DISCMINATION IS FORBIDDEN (1964); Avins, Toward Freedom of Choice in Em-
ployment, 13 N.Y.L.F. 213, 253 (1969); Civil Rights-Civil Rights Act of 1964-
Employer Held to Have Been Engaged in Religious Discrimination Under Title
VI1 Without Proof of Discriminatory Intent, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Discriminatory Intent].
In looking at the reasonableness of the private employer's action, courts become
general boards of review, often in effect placing the employer in the same position
as the state when it is defendant in a case involving an alleged infringement of
constitutional rights. Whenever a question arises concerning the constitutional
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In Dewey, the court found the act in question to be discriminatory
under the final impact test.3 4 However, to determine whether this dis-
crimination was illegal, the court applied a twofold test established by
EEOC35 guidelines. Under that test, "(l) the employer must make rea-
sonable accommodations to the religious needs of its employees; (2)
unless such accommodations will cause undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business." 36 Moreover, under those guidelines it is
the employer who has the burden of proving that an undue hardship
renders the accommodation unreasonable.37 Thus, the court showed its
concern for the employer's position by use of this undue hardship test.
On the other hand, it shifted the burden of producing evidence to the
employer, which is erroneous unless a prima facie case of illegality has
been established.V 8
validity of state action, the state has the burden of proof to justify its actions by
proving a compelling need in the public interest. Likewise, when the courts in
utilizing the various corollary -tests look at the employer's evidence to see if the
action is justified, they are in effect shifting the burden of producing evidence to
the employer. But applying this burden to a private employer is an erroneous
application. The first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,
under which the states are held accountable, apply only to states, not to private
employers. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Civil Rights Cases, log U.S.
3 (1883). Moreover, the cases in which the burden of producing evidence is shifted
to the employer are cases arising under an alleged violation of a specific statute,
not under an alleged breach of constitutional rights. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Civil Rights Cases, lo9 U.S. 3 (1883); Gregory v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 3oo F. Supp.
709 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Johnson v. State, Civil Service Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157
N.W.2d 747 (1968); Discriminatory Intent 1147.
Note that even the states can infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Thus, in Farrell v. Smith, 31o F.
Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970), a state vocational school was upheld in requiring that
its pupils be clean-shaven where it was proved that this requirement was to further
a legitimate interest-obtaining jobs for the students. In upholding the state action
the court looked to see if the state had acted reasonably, if its economic purpose
was legitimate and if the interest of the state in requiring clean-shaven pupils out-
weighed the right of the student to wear a beard.
[P]laintiff has been forced to choose between his religion and his job. Such
a choice limits plaintiff's free exercise of his religion, and is thereby discriminatory
in its effect." 300 F. Supp. at 714 (emphasis added).
3Note 9, supra.
m3oo F. Supp. at 714 (emphasis added).
"The court in Dewey stated that
Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refus-
ing to hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious
beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that an undue
hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious
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In Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States,3 9 an action arising from alleged discrimination resulting from
a seniority system, a court again found discrimination under the
final impact test. It applied two additional criteria to determine
whether the alleged discrimination was illegal. The court required,
first, a showing that there was an economic purpose underlying the
discriminatory system and, secondly, that the interests of the employer
in maintaining the discriminatory system were sufficient to justify
the discrimination. Thus, what may be referred to as an economic pur-
poses .test40 was used to determine whether the employer had any
legitimate management basis for the discriminatory system. An addi-
tional test, a balance of interests test,41 was used to weigh the overall
interests of the employer in maintaining the discriminatory system
against the interests of the employee. In its conclusion the court implied
that the employer had either to prove its system necessary or to justify
it, but not both.42 However, the employer failed to do either, and the
system was not allowed to stand. Again the court indicated a shift in
the burden of producing evidence by stating that, "on a showing by a
defendant that the limitation . . . is related to reasonable economic
purpose, the limitation... is not unlawful." 43 And again it must be
noted that the employer bears no burden of producing evidence until
the employee has established a prima facie case of illegality.44
-In briefly reviewing the two previous cases it should be noted that
both involved alleged discrimination against -those already employed,
rather than potential employees. Although the law does not differenti-
ate between the two situations, a court might. Moreover, even though
the undue hardship test in Dewey was burdensome on the employer,
the court expressed a desire to apply a balance of interests test, but
indicated that there was not sufficient evidence on the record to do so.4 5
In attmpting to arrive at the proper conclusion in discrimination
cases, the courts can also examine the legislative intent underlying the
'0416 F.2d 98o (5 th Cir. 1969).
40This -test is derived from the use of the court's term "economic purpose".
416 F.2d at 992.
4 For a discussion of this test see Veu Casovis, Title FII-Religious Discrimina-
tion in Employment-Is "Effect on Individual Religious Belief' Discrimination Based
on Religion Under the Civil Rights Act of z964?, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 327, 331 (969).
'-"[T]he imposition of a system that perpetuates and renews the effects of
racial discrimination in the guise of job seniority is not necessary or justified at
Bogalusa." 416 F.2d at 99o (emphasis added).
"3Id. at 992.
"Note 33 supra.
03oo F. Supp. at 711. See Veu Casovis, Title VII-Religious Discrimination in
Employment-Is "Effect on Individual Religious Belief' Discrimination Based on
Religion Under the Civil Rights Act of r964?, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 331 (1969).
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civil rights enactments. 46 The intent of the New York Legislature is
clearly expressed in the Human Rights Law.47 It is, among other things,
"to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment .... ',48 But
the statute spells out that the type of discrimination the legislature
wishes to eliminate is discrimination "because of the ... creed ... of
any individual . . . ,,49 It is this latter type that is made illegal.50
Greyhound, in the instant case, based its employment decision on
physical appearance, not creed. 51 Discrimination because of physical
appearance is not illegal.52 Therefore, the employer's hiring practice
would not be deemed illegal under the per se test because the hiring
practice itself is not illegal. But the practice could be questioned under
the final impact test since it did result in discrimination against an
individual because of his creed. In further testing to decide whether
this discrimination was illegal, the appellate court determined that the
policy underlying the hiring practice was a "practical business policy".
Thus, Greyhound passed what might be referred to as an economic
purposes test. The court further noted that Greyhound could not be
charged with lack of good faith.54 However, by discussing the fact
that a private employer is not required to make exceptions to its es-
tablished and uniformly applied personnel policies in order to accom-
modate the religious practice of a potential employee,55 the court in-
dicated that it was also utilizing a balance of interests test.
The balance of interests test is of utmost concern in this employment
context because neither the amendments to the United States Con-
stitution nor the civil rights acts offer more protection to the private
right of an employee to wear a beard than to the right of a private em-
ployer to refuse to hire an employee because of his appearance.56 There
is nothing to indicate that religious reasons for wearing a beard change
'"See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1918).
'7N.. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
-'*The other purposes of N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney Supp. 197o) are
to insure that every individual shall have an equal opportunity to
participate fully in the economic, cultural and intellectual life of
the state; to encourage and promote the development and execution
by all persons within the state of such state program ....
'0N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 197o) .
ON.Y. Exzc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
G111 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
12N.Y. Exc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
0311 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
Wld.
m1 d.
1 Under the amendments to the United States Constitution, only state and
federal instrumentalities can be precluded from refusing to hire, and the civil
rights acts do not concern themselves with physical appearance.
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the result.57 If the employer is required to hire one who for religious
purposes wears a beard, it would follow that he would be deprived of
the right to refuse to hire any qualified applicant wearing a beard for
secular reasons under the theory of "reverse discrimination".5 8 For if an
employer hires one applicant because his religious beliefs dictate that
he wear a beard, but refuses to hire another bearded applicant who has
no religious basis for his beard, he is, in effect, discriminating against
the latter because his religious beliefs do not dictate that he wear a
beard. This is reverse discrimination because of ones creed and as
such is specifically prohibited by law.59 Furthermore, if an employer
were not permitted to refuse to hire an employee because of a beard
worn for religious purposes, it would follow that he could not refuse
to hire a qualified applicant because of any religiously motivated be-
havior.6 0 Likewise, for reasons of reverse discrimination, he could not
refuse to hire other applicants whose identical behavior was not re-
ligiously motivated.
The courts in applying the various tests have shown anything but
uniformity in application and result.6 1 The reason lies in the amount
of subjectivity involved in the tests and the inadequate guidelines es-
tablished by the laws.62 However, it is important to note one aspect
"See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 '(963) (dissenting opinion by Harlan,
J.); Discriminatory Intent 1147.
58Reverse discrimination is used here -to refer to illegal discriminaion directed
against a member of a majority as opposed to a minority group. See Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968); Garfinkel and Cahn,
Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring and Fair Employment Practicev
Commissions, 2o LAB. L.J. 357, 37, (1969); Spitz, Tailoring the Techniques to
Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination, 14 BuFF. L. REv. 79, 98"99
(1964).
5N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970). In the principal case respondent
is actually seeking preferential hiring (a positive term for reverse discrimination).
He does not advocate that the employer hire all applicants with beards. He
only advocates that he be employed since he has a religous reason for his
beard. This is reverse discrimination because of creed and is forbidden by
law. See Garfinkel and Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring
and Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 2o LAB. L.J. 357, 371 (1969); Spitz,
Tailoring the Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination, i I
BUr. L. REy. 79, 98-99 (1964)-
6"To do otherwise would be inequitable. Of course, the religiously motivated
behavior must be legal. If it were not, the employer could not be compelled to
hire. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
OCompare Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 4o (C.D. Cal. 1970)
and Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 3oo F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969) with
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d i (5 th Cir. 1969).
6242 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (1964) prohibits discrimination "because of ... religion
.; N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1970) prohibits discrimination "be-
cause of ... creed." However, neither defines exactly what constitutes discrimination
because of religion or creed.
CASE COMMENTS
that can often reconcile the results. In these decisions courts have at-
tempted to effectuate the principle underlying the civil rights laws,
namely that an employee be looked at as an individual, not on the
basis of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.03 Yet at the same time
the courts attempt to maintain their policy of interfering as little
as possible in the safety and efficiency of an employer's business opera-
tions.64 Thus, the flexibility allowed by the law has been beneficial to
both employer and employee in this respect. Nevertheless, in cases
involving similar facts, different results have been produced not only
by the use of different tests, but by the use of the very same test.
0 5
Thus, in Greyhound another court might have reached the opposite
conclusion. It might have concluded that Greyhound had no reasonable
business purpose for its requirement and that the interest of a po-
tential employee to wear a beard far outweighed that of the employer
to refuse to hire because of a beard. But the court should never have
applied these tests since the employee never established prima fade
evidence of illegal discrimination.06 The only charge made by the em-
ployee was that he was not hired because he wore a beard; since that is
not prima fade illegal, the court should not then have looked to Grey-
1See Garfinkel and Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring
and Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 2o LAB. L.J. 357, 372 (1969).
e'See Local i89, AFL-CIO v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 992; Quarles v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519 (E.D. Va. 1968).
8Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the Court ruled that a state may pass legislation
depriving some merchants of the Jewish faith of one day of work per week (which
totaled one sixth of their working hours since they are constrained to close from
sundown Friday to sundown Saturday on account of their religious beliefs) by
enacting a Sunday closing law. In upholding Pennsylvania's legislation the Supreme
Court applied the final impact and the balance of interests tests and held that
since the act applied equally to all groups and since it was to further a legitituate
secular purpose (a day of rest), as opposed to a religious purpose, it did not violate
any provision of the Constitution. Moreover, the interest of the state in providing
a uniform day of rest outweighed that of the merchants not to have this additional
burden on the exercise of their religion. Yet, in Sherbert, the Court ruled uncon-
stitutional a South Carolina statute barring anyone who refused to work on Saturday
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The plaintiff in Sherbert, a
Seventh Day Adventist, refused to work on Saturday because of religious beliefs.
The Court, although stating that it was not overruling Braunfeld, applied the
final impact and balance of interests tests and held that although a statute may be
fair on its face and apply equally to all, its application might result in discrimina-
tion to one group and, thus, deny one his constitutional rights. It held that the
interests of the state in having a uniform policy did not outweigh the more direct
burden on the employee. Thus, although the discrimina.ion against Jews in Braun-
feld was not deemed sufficient to render that act upzonstitutional, the discrimina-
tion against Seventh Day Adventists in Sherbert was.
68Note 33 supra.
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hound for evidence to justify its hiring practice.67 Greyhound's hiring
practice might have been the most arbitrary imaginable, but so long as
there was no prima facie evidence that it was illegal, Greyhound should
not have been required to produce rebuttal evidence.
68
Thus, because of different tests and the different results produced
by the use of the same tests, due to the amount of subjectivity involved,
employers are placed in the impossible position of having to read the
mind of the court to determine whether their hiring practices are legal.
This failure to provide ascertainable standards perpetuates litigation,
which effectively counteracts the purpose underlying the entire civil
rights scheme.69 To establish the foundation for an equitable system
civil rights legislation must act as a guide, not as a puzzle to the em-
ployers who are to work within -the system. In the absence of such
legislation, the courts should attempt to establish ascertainable stand-
ards that will provide the necessary guidelines.
That the final impact test is a necessity to courts in ferreting out
discriminatory acts that would otherwise go unnoticed can be con-
cluded from the foregoing analysis. However, the test is subject to both
abuse on the part of the courts and misinterpretation on the part of
employers. For whenever an employer bases a decision concerning em-
ployment on a factor that is affected by race, creed, color, sex or na-
tional origin, that decision will usually prove to be discriminatory to
some group despite his intentions. 7 0 Therefore, the test must not be used
to the extent that it deprives employers of the right to maintain reason-
able requirements for employment.71 Nor should the court in applying
corollary tests look to the employer for any evidence justifying his em-
ployment practices until the employee has proved a prima fade case of
illegality.
Of the corollary tests examined, the balance of interests test is the
most equitable. Under an undue hardship or an economic purposes
test courts will sometimes examine matters not crucial to the issue in
the case.72 With the balance of interests test a court gets to the crux of
7Id.
68Id.
n0rhe purpose underlying the civil rights scheme is "to eliminate and prevent
discrimination in employment...." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 29o (McKinney Supp. 1970).
"'See Discriminatory Intent 1147, 1149 11.12.
7'This was the result of the ruling in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), where an employer's questioning an employee as to the
number of non-traffic arrests was held to be illegal despite the fact that he would
be liable for the employee's tortious acts committed within the scope of employment
under the theory of respondeat superior.
'2See Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 46 F.2d
98o (5th Cir. 1969); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich.
1969).
